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THE DUTY TO DESIRE: LOVE,
FRIENDSHIP, AND SEXUALITY IN SOME
PURITAN THEORIES OF MARRIAGE
Edmund Leites

When philosophers or political scientists look for
early statements of some modern Western ideas of marriage, they are likely to turn to Locke's Two Treatises of
Government, for there we find elements or hints of the
modern view that marriage is a contractual relation
between two autonomous and equal partners. Husband
and wife jointly set the terms of their relationship; their
particular interests determine its character; they retain
the freedom to leave when the terms of the contract are
no longer satisfied. In this search of forerunners, however, it is a mistake to limit one's reading of seventeenth-century texts to Locke's. In the following pages,
I hope to persuade you that a number of seventeenthcentury English theologians and preachers, for the most
part Puritan, deserve equal attention. I shall consider
William Ames and Richard Baxter, two of the most
important casuists for seventeenth-century Puritans;
Thomas Gataker, William Gouge, and Daniel Rogers,
three Puritan clergymen who distinguished themselves
particularly in their writings on marriage; and Jeremy
Taylor, who was no Puritan, but whose attitudes toward marriage were in many respects like those of the
Puritan casuists and theologians.
By calling someone " P u r i t a n , " I mean to say that he
or she was part of the sixteenth- and seventeenthcentury popular movement to reform English Christianity. In spite of the many divisions within this movement, there are general features which characterize all
the intellectual and social tendencies I call "Puritan."
Puritans demanded that they and others lead a life
which was, in the realm of everyday conduct, ethically
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1979
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strict; in the realm of belief, meticulously scrupulous; in
matters of ritual, simple (thus they were suspicious of
cross and mitre, surplice and relic); and in matters of
piety, deeply concerned with the inward state of the
soul (thus they were hostile to a church satisfied with
the perfunctory performance of outward acts). 1 This
piety, as we shall see, has its analogue in the Puritans'
notion of conjugal love: an outward fulfillment of the
duties of marriage was not enough; the proper intentions and feelings toward your spouse also had to exist.
I

A few reflections on the Roman Catholic background
of Puritan ideas are in order. Let us begin with the
Roman Catechism of 1566, " a careful distillation of
Counter-Reformation theology," in which we find a
statement of the ends of marriage as established by
God; we should seek at least one of them in marrying,
although we may have other ends as well (Noonan,
1965: 313-314). It tells us that the first of the appropriate
ends is the
. . . very partnership of diverse sexes—sought by natural instinct,
and compacted in the hope of mutual help so that one aided by the
other may more easily bear the discomforts of life and sustain the
weakness of old age. Another is the appetite of procreation, not so
much that heirs of property and riches be left, but that worshipers of the true faith and religion be educated . . . And this is the
one cause why God instituted marriage at the beginning. . . . The
third is one which after the fall of the first parent was added to the
other causes, . . . [for man's] appetite began to fight with right
reason; so indeed he who is conscious of his weakness and does
not wish to bear the battle of the flesh may use the remedy to avoid
the sins of lust (Roman Catechism of 1566: 2. 8. 13, 14; quoted by
Noonan, 1965: 313).

In making companionship, specifically mutual support and comfort, one of the chief purposes of marriage,
in making this quite distinct from the procreative purpose, and in listing companionship first among these
purposes, the authors of the catechism went against
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol3/iss3/4
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those within the Catholic world, such as Augustine,
who made little of this side of marriage. Genesis (2.
18-23) tells us that God did not find it good for man to be
alone; therefore, he gave Adam a helpmeet: woman,
bone of his bone, flesh of his flesh; she pleased him
greatly. But why, asks Augustine (De Genesi ad Litteram Libri Duodecim, 9. 7) did Adam need a woman to
be his helpmeet? As far as he can see, he replies, she
would have been of no use to him, or any man, if she had
not been capable of bearing children: " N o n itaque
video, ad quod aliud adiutorium mulier facta sit viro, si
generandi causa substrahitur." What, then, of woman
as delightful companion to man, comforter, supporter?
What of man as this to woman? This receives scant
mention in the theology of Augustine, who was, in
matters of marriage, sexuality, and the status of woman, often more liberal than other Fathers of the
Church. In his commentary on Genesis (9.7), he repeats
what he had said some years before in De Bono Coniugale: the goods of marriage are three, fides, proles,
sacramentum.
Fides, "fidelity," includes paying the
marriage debt as well as keeping from intercourse with
others; proles, the good of offspring, includes the support and education of children as well as their creation;
marriage is a sacramentum,
a "symbol of stability,"
therefore indissoluble. None of these goods, as Noonan
(1965: 127-128) convincingly argues, includes the delight in the companionship and comfort which a man
and a woman can give to each other.
Within the medieval and early modern Roman
Church, Aristotle's Nichomachean
Ethics sustained
those who sought to give a more honored place to
marriage as friendship. In the Ethics, Aristotle says that
marriage is a kind of friendship, indeed, one more natural to human beings than the friendship of those who
constitute the polis (Nichomachean Ethics 1162a 15-20).
True, we are by nature political animals (Politics
1253a5-10), but we are even more inclined to form
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1979
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couples than we are to form cities. We are, as it is put in
the Latin Aristotle upon which Thomas commented,
"in natura coniugale magis quam politicam" (Thomas
Aquinas, Sententia Libri Ethicorum 8. 12).
Aristotle sees three grounds for friendship: friends
can be useful to each other, they can delight in one
another's company (for a variety of reasons), and they
can love one another's virtue. All three are available to
the married couple. Spouses can be useful to each other
in the running of a household, they can please and delight each other in their sexual relations, and they
can love one another's virtue, if they are virtuous
(Nichomachean
Ethics 1162a25-30). Marriage love is
special, for it can unite into one all the kinds of
friendship we can ever have: virtuous men can love
each other for their virtue; youths typically love each
other for sheer pleasure; old men may well be friends
because it is useful to them, since people " a t that age
pursue not the pleasant but the useful" (Nichomachean
Ethics 1156a5-1156b10). Spouses, however, may love
one another for all these reasons, at any stage of life.
The idea of marriage as friendship is taken up by
Thomas. Indeed, he relies upon Aristotle's notion that
there must be a certain equality in all relationships to
defend his belief that a man can have only one wife at a
time. If reason deems it improper for a woman to have
several husbands at one time, as it does, then, Thomas
argues, it is wrong for a man to have several wives at
one time, for marriage is a friendship, and "equality is a
condition of friendship." " W e r e it lawful for a man to
have several wives," but not lawful for a wife to have
several husbands, " t h e friendship of a wife for her
husband would not be freely bestowed, but servile as it
were," for she would not be his true equal. " A n d this
argument," says Thomas, "is confirmed by experience: since where men have several wives, the wives
Gentiles
are treated as s e r v a n t s " (Summa Contra
3. 124). " T h e greatest friendship" seems to be between
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol3/iss3/4
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spouses, Thomas writes, for husband and wife " a r e
made one not only in the act of carnal intercourse,
which even among dumb animals causes an agreeable
fellowship, but also as partners in the whole intercourse
of daily life: so that, to indicate this, man must leave
father and mother (Gen. 2. 24) for his wife's s a k e "
{Summa Contra Gentiles 3. 123).
The approach of Aristotle and Thomas to marriage
lives on in the sixteenth-century Roman catechism
from which I quoted earlier. 3 The same belief that marriage is a friendship, and a source of mutual delight and
comfort, sustains some of the liberalizing tendencies
within the late medieval and early modern church concerning sexual delight within marriage. Augustine took
the position that God warrants and permits the pleasure and delight of intercourse among spouses only to
the extent that it furthers the end of procreation:
" W h a t food is for the health of man, intercourse is for
the health of the species, and each is not without carnal delight which cannot be lust, if modified and
restrained by temperance, it is brought to a natural
u s e , " that is, done for the sake of procreation (De
Bono Coniugale 16. 18). Unlike Aristotle, he did not
think of sexual delight as a constituent of marriage
friendship. Aristotle's belief remained alive in spite of
Augustine. It was fully presented by Thomas in his
commentary on the philosopher's Ethics; moreover,
Thomas accepts Aristotle's outlook, although he does
not make much of it, in the Summa Contra Gentiles
(3. 123). The Scotsman John Major, professor of theology at the Universities of Paris, Glasgow, and St.
Andrews during the first half of the sixteenth century,
does much more with it. In his commentary on the
sentences of Peter Lombard, he writes that "whatever
men say, it is difficult to prove that a man sins in
knowing his own wife for the sake of having pleasure,"
for husband and wife marry not only to have children,
but to provide "consolation" to one another (John
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1979
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Major, 1519: 4. 31; quoted in Noonan, 1965: 311). Others argued for the opinion permitting intercourse between spouses for pleasure on different grounds; the
defense of this opinion in the seventeenth century provoked fierce opposition f r o m rigorists within the
Church, especially the theologians of Louvain, led by
the Irishman John Sinnigh, who called the opinion
permitting intercourse for pleasure " b r u t i s h " (Noonan, 1965: 326).
Not even John Major went so far as to make the life
of the married equal in merit to the life of committed
celibates. The doctrine that celibacy is the superior
state, virtuously defended by writers like Jerome and
Chrysostom in the ancient world (Noonan, 1965: 276),
was fully upheld by Thomas, close as he was to Aristotle; upheld, as well, by the theologicans of the late
medieval and early modern Church who took the view
condemned by Sinnigh as " b r u t i s h . " They would have
no doubt assented to the views on celibacy found in
the 'large' catechism of Cardinal Bellarmine, the
Dichiarazione
piu copiosa delta dottrina
cristiana
(1598), of great influence in the seventeenth-century
Church. In his catechism, published in English in 1604,
the " S t u d e n t " asks, "Whether it is better to take the
Sacrament of Matrimonie or to kepe virginitie"? The
" M a s t e r " replies,
The Apostle S. Paul hath cleared this doubt, having written that
he w h o j o y n e t h himself in Mariage doth wel, but he that doth not
joyne himself, but kepeth virginite doth better. And the reason
is, because Mariage is a thing humane, Virginitie is Angelical.
Mariage is according to nature, Virginitie is above nature. And
not only virginitie but widowhood is also better than mariage.
Therefore whereas our Saviour said in a parable, that the good
sede yelded in one fild thirtie fold fruite, in an other threescore,
in an other a hundred fold: the holie Doctors have declared, that
the thirtie fold fruite is of Matrimonie, the threescore fold of
widowhood, the hundreth fold of virginitie (Bellarmine, 1604:
257-258).

Bellarmine, the Church's greatest polemicist against
the Protestant movement, clearly meant to answer
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol3/iss3/4
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those Protestants who denied the spiritual superiority
of celibacy. Among them were the Puritans. " L e t al
Papists, Jesuites, Priests, or others," writes Rogers
(1642: 9), "with all their fomenters and adherents,
tremb'e and be ashamed, who have dared so many
times dishonour marriage, and so many wayes to defile
i t . " "They know not the benefit of the married est a t e , " writes Gouge (1626: 242, 123), " w h o prefer
single life before i t . " He calls upon " t h e admirerers
and praisers of a single estate" to "bring forthe all
their reasons, and put them in the other scole against
marriage. If these two be duly poised, and rightly
weyed," he says, " w e should find single life too light
to be compared with honest marriage." 4
The Church of England's rejection of institutionalized celibacy, whether in monastic orders or in the life
of the secular priest, permitted a heightened appreciation of marriage. But the character of that appreciation
remained to be determined! What was so good about
married life? The Puritans rooted their love of marriage in the conviction that marriage is for the mutual
support and comfort of a husband and wife, a conviction already developed within the Roman Catholic
world. The Puritan William Gouge (1626: I, 122-123)
writes that "the ends of Mariage" are three:
1. That the world might be increased . . . 2. That men might
avoid fornication . . . 3. That man and wife might be a mutual
helpe to one another, (Gen. 2, 18.) An helpe as for bringing
forthe, so bringing up children; as for erecting, so for well governing the family. An helpe also for well ordering prosperity, and
well bearing adversitie. An helpe in healthe and sicknesse. An
helpe while both live together, and when one is taken by death
from the other. . . . N o such helpe can man have from any other
creature as from a wife; or a woman, as from an husband.

Puritans often argue for the excellence of marriage
by pointing out that it was instituted by God before
humankind had fallen; it was not simply a remedy for
our concupiscence (though that it became, once we
fell). It was part of the paradisical state itself. Who first
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1979
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instituted marriage, where did he do so, and when? In
his creation of Eve " t o make a helpe meet for man,"
God established marriage; so the author was God, the
place was Paradise, and the time was the most perfect
that was " e v e r in the world" (Gouge, 1626: 121).
Ames (1639: 197) writes that marriage, in general,
"seemeth more excellent than the single life, for "in
the beginning, it was ordained by God, for the bettering of man's condition." 5
But why did Adam need a wife? Why did he need to
better his condition in this way? What was wrong with
Paradise as it was? The Puritan do not share Augustine's outlook; Eve is more than the bearer of Adam's
children, she is his companion: it was not good that he
was alone (Gen. 2. 18). Seeker (1658: 15) puts it well:
When all other creatures had their mates, Adam wanted his:
Though he was the Emperor of the Earth, and the Admiral of the
Seas, yet in Paradise without a companion, though he was truly
happy yet he was not fully happy; Though he had enough for his
board, yet he had not enough for his bed; Though he had many
creatures to serve him, yet he wanted a creature to solace him;
when he was compounded in creation, he must be compleated by
conjunction; when he had no sinne to hurt him, then he must
have a wife to help him; It is not good that man should he alone.

Therefore, God determined to make him a helpmeet.
But as Gouge (1626-27: I, 121) writes, none of the birds
or beasts that God had already created would do, so
Adam's creator created woman out of " m a n s substance and side, and after his image." Her maker then
presented Eve to Adam for his consideration. The first
man manifested " a good liking to h e r , " so God gave
her to him " t o bee his wife." Thus " t h e inviolable law
of the near and firm union of man and wife" was first
"enacted."
It is true, before Adam had Eve, he had God, but
this was not enough to remove his loneliness; nor
could it be assuaged by the creatures that already
"lived on the earth, or breathed the air." He needed a
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol3/iss3/4

8

Leites: The Duty to Desire: Love, Friendship, and Sexuality in Some Purit
48

woman; and once a woman was created, she needed a
man.
The cure of Adam's loneliness was to be love: his
love for Eve, and her love for him; Eve's loneliness
would be cured in the same way. Marriage provides
this balm. The Puritans say that men must love their
wives, and wives, their husbands: this is a duty that
flows out of one of the purposes for which marriage
was first instituted: thus Gouge (1626: 131) tells us that
there must be "mutuall love betwixt man and wife . . .
else the end and right use of mariage will be perverted." Baxter (1678: II, 40) tells us infirm tones that
"The first Duty of Husbands is to Love their Wives
(and Wives their Husbands) with a true intire Conjugal
Love.'''' "Conjugal L o v e " is a "mayne and joint duty
of the married," says Rogers (1642: 146).
The Puritans' appreciation of conjugal love was accompanied by an acute awareness of how bad a bad
marriage was; their sense of this was no doubt sharpened by their appreciation of the pleasures and comfort of a happily married life. Marriage, writes Gataker
(1624: 8) "is a business of the greatest
consequence,
and that whereon the maine comfort or discomfort of a
mans life doth depend; that which may make thine
house to bee as an heaven or an hell here upon earth."
"They that enter into the state of marriage," writes
Jeremy Taylor (1655: II, 224-225), who is in accord with
the Puritans on this matter, "cast a dye of the greatest
contingency, and yet of the greatest interest in the
world, next to the last throw for eternity." A happy
marriage provides a joy that lasts throughout life, an
unhappy one creates lasting sorrow for both spouses. A
wife "hath no sanctuary to retire to, from an evill husband; she must remain at home, the very source of her
unhappiness, to "dwell upon her sorrow." A husband
can run " f r o m many hours of his sadness, yet he must
r e t u r n to it again, and w h e n he sits a m o n g his
neighbours he remembers the objection that lies in his
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1979
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bosome, and he sighs deeply." Puritan authors sometimes referred to the words of Augustine, who, on more
than one occasion, said that a bad marriage is like a bad
conscience: you cannot get away from it. When love is
absent between husband and wife, writes Baxter
(1678: II, 41), it is like " a Bone out of joynt; there is no
ease, no order" between them, till they are set right
again.
The whole character of the love required, then, is
this: spouses should find their mates to be the most
special and delightful persons in their lives, throughout
their lives. The Puritans who uphold this view are far
from being hostile to romance; indeed, they make romance a duty of married life. 11
Marriage is by no means only a sensual relation for
the Puritan theorists of marriage; spouses must also be
spiritually devoted to each other. Baxter (1678: II, 44)
tells us that "A principal duty between husband and
wife, is, with special care, and skill, and diligence, to
help each other in the knowledge, and obedience of
God, in order to their salvation.'''' This, too, is an obligation which falls upon both husband and wife: wives as
well as husbands for their spiritual and moral wellbeing. Wives who are normally required to be docile
and submissive thus have a certain freedom to be
openly critical of their husbands—in the service (or
apparent service) of God, of course.
Baxter (1678: II, 18-31; 1675: 307) urged husbands
and wives to pray together "in private," as well as with
the larger family, which includes children and servants.
Gouge (1626: 138-139) made conjugal prayer one of the
duties of marriage. He tells us that the need for " a true,
spiritual, matrimonial love" between husband and wife
is one of the things "most meet to be mentioned in
private prayer betwixt" them; spouses should pray
"that such needful gifts and graces as are wanting in
either of them may be wrought: and such vices and
infirmities as they are subject unto may be rendered."
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol3/iss3/4
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Such prayer between husband and wife provided one
private occasion where wives could openly criticize
their husbands. We need not simply assume that they
did so: Baxter (1681: 70-71) tells us, with startling
frankness, that his late wife
. . . was very desirous that we should all have lived in a constancy
of Devotion, and a blameless Innocency: And in this respect she
was the meetest helper that I could have had in the world (the ever
I was acquainted with): For I was apt to be over-careless in my
Speech, and too backward in my Duty; And [at her death] she was
still endavoring to bring me to greater wariness and strictness in
both: If I spake rashly or sharply, it offended her: If I carried it (as
I was apt) with too much neglect of Ceremony, or humble Complement to any, she would modestly tell me of it: If my very looks
seemed not pleasant, she would have me amend them (which my
weak pained state of Body undisposed me to do:) If I forgat any
Week to Catechize my Servants, and familiarly instruct them
(besides my ordinary Family-Duties) she was troubled at my
remisness. And whereas of late years my decay of Spirits, and
deseased heaviness and pain, made me much more seldom and
cold in profitable Conference and Discourse in my house, then I
had been when I was younger, and had more Ease, and Spirits,
and natural Vigour, she much blamed me, and was troubled at it,
as a wrong to her self and others: . . . [though] of late years, my
constant weakness and pain . . . [kept me much in] my bed, that I
was seldomer in secret Prayer with my Wife then she desired.

This freedom of wives to criticize their husbands
creates a tension within the Puritan conception of marriage: for the Puritans are firmly convinced that men
must rule and wives must obey. Gataker (1620: 1) approvingly quotes Colossians (3. 18): "Wives,
submit
yourselves unto your Husbands, as it is comely in the
Lord." When thinking along these lines, the Puritans
call for restraint in feeling as well as submission in
action. Women must restrain their expressions of anger
and discontent, even if their husbands" conduct gives
them good grounds. 1 2 Docility and a loving gentleness
toward husbands are prime wifely virtues. 1 3 This wifely
restraint was to be balanced, according to the theorists
of marriage, by husbands' gentle and restrained use of
their own authority. 1 4
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1979
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The love required in marriage is more than a general
good will or benevolence towards one's spouse; it is
more than the Christian charity we may bear toward
many: instead, it is a special sort of love which is required only of the married. 6 To begin with, it is sensual,
as well as spiritual. Rogers (1642: 150) tells us that " b y
conjugall love," he means "not only Christian love, a
grace of God's spirit: (for marriage borders much what
upon nature and flesh) nor yet a carnall and sudden flash
of affection, completely enflamed by concupiscence:
(rather brutish than humane) but a sweet compounde of
both, religion and nature," which is "properly called
Marriage love."
Marriage was instituted to provide mutual support
and comfort; sensuous delight in the body of one's
spouse is an essential element of the comfort which
marriage must provide: thus to take (and encourage)
delight is a duty which falls equally on both spouses:
"Husband and wife," writes Baxter (1678: II, 42),
"must take delight in Love, and company, and converse of each other. Gataker (1620: 44) tells us that one
of a husband's duties of " l o v e " toward his wife is " J o y
& delight in her." He continues with a passage from
Proverbs, often quoted by Puritan writers on marriage:
"Drinke, saith the wise man [of Proverbs], the water of
thine own cist erne: . . . and rejoyce in the wife of thy
youth". Let her be with thee as a loving Hind, and the
pleasant Roe: Let her brests or bosome content thee at
all times: and delight continually, or as the word there
is, even doate on the Love of her" (Proverbs 5: 15, 18,
19).7
This sensuous love is not simply permitted, given the
existence of a higher, holier, 'spiritual' relation between man and wife, nor is it allowed only to forward
the other purposes of marriage. It is required as a constituent and intrinsic element of a good marriage. This
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol3/iss3/4

12

Leites: The Duty to Desire: Love, Friendship, and Sexuality in Some Purit
52

sensual affection and delight must continue unabated,
with the full intensity of youthful desire, throughout the
whole of married life. " K e e p up your Conjugal Love in
a constant heat and vigor," writes Baxter (1678: II,
43). From the very outset, your spouse must be the
apple of your eye. As life goes on, you must delight in
your spouse as if he or she were your new and youthful
husband or bride: Gataker (1620: 37) writes that you
must not suffer your "love to grow
luke-warm."8
Physical deformities may not weaken your enjoyment of your spouse. If there are (objectively) more
beautiful women or handsome men, disadvantageous
comparisons should not be made: the pleasure you take
in your spouse should be so great, there should be no
place for any defect. 9 Counseling the wife, Rogers
(1642: 157) says, "Poare upon your own husband, and
his parts, let him be the vaile of your eies, as Abimelec
told Sara, and looke no f u r t h e r . " Then counseling the
husband, he says, let your wife " b e e your furthest
object: thinke you no virtues in any beyonde hers: those
that are but small, yet make them great by oft contemplation: those that are greater, esteeme and value at
their due rate." Gouge (1626: 208) writes that " a n husband's affection to his wife must be answerable to his
opinion of her: hee ought therefore to delight in his wife
intirely, that is, so to delight in her, as wholly and only
delighting in her . . . if a man have wife, not very
beautiful, or proper, but having some deformity in her
b o d y , " he should nonetheless "delight in her, as if she
were the finest and every way most compleat woman in
the world." 1 0
Life is not all authority and submission; the Puritans knew
that they lived in a material world of food and drink, bedstead
and fireplace. Thus they said that husband and wife must also
care for each other's material and worldly comfort. Men who
do not care for the physical well-being of their wives are
severely condemned; 1 5 prudence in managing household affairs is one of the chief virtues of a wife. 1 6 G a t a k e r
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(1624: 18-19) tell us that
It is no shame or staine . . . f o r a woman to be housewifely, be she
never so well borne, be she never so wealthy. For it is the womans
trade so to be: it is the end of her creation', it is that she was made
for. She was made for man, and given to man, not to be a playfellow, or a bed-fellow, or a table-mate,
onely with him, (and yet
to be all these too,) but to be a yoake-fellow,
a worke-fellow,
a
fellow labourer with him, to be an assistant and an helper unto
him, in the managing of such domestical! and household
affaires.

Thus the prospect that a woman is prudent ought to
weigh heavily when a man is choosing a mate. The
wives of not a few eminent ministers in both Old and
New England handled all the financial affairs of the
family, leaving their husbands with greater liberty to
c o n c e r n t h e m s e l v e s with m a t t e r s spiritual and
ecclesiastical; the men praised their women for this in
no uncertain terms. 1 7
Some writers put this obligation to care for the ethical, religious, and worldly well-being of one's spouse in
words that will remind you of Aristotle and Thomas:
they say that husband and wife must be the best of
friends; you may have no greater friend than your
spouse. It may be asked, says Taylor (1662: 79-83),
"whether a friend may be more than Husband or Wife"
to you? To which he answers,
. . . it can neither be reasonable or just, prudent or lawfull: but the
reason is, because marriage is the Queen of friendships, in which
there is a communication of all that can be communicated by
friendship . . . other friendships are a part of this [marriage
friendship], they are marriages too, less indeed then the other,
because they cannot, must not, be all the indearment which the
other is; yet that being the principal, is the measure of the rest, and
all to be honoured by like dignities, and measured by the same
rules, . . . friendships are Marriages of the soul, and of fortunes
and interests, and counsels . . . [as] they are brotherhoods too
18

The Puritans were familiar with Cicero's De Amicitia
as well as Aristotle's Ethics, but they are closer to
Aristotle than they are to Cicero, for the Roman thinks
that friendship can occur only among men. Cicero finds
much of the meaning of friendship in politics and war,
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol3/iss3/4
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although he thinks it can be enjoyed by those who have
honorably retired from these worlds. By their own
example, friends must encourage each other to act honorably in these harsh realms: we can love virtuous men
" w h o m we have never seen," says Cicero (De Amicitia
8. 28-29); " n o w , " he continues, "if the force of integrity is so great that we love i t . . . in those we have never
seen, . . . what wonder that men's souls are stirred
when they think they see clearly the virtue and goodness of those with whom a close intimacy is possible?"
Cicero offers Gaius Luscinus Fabricius, the Roman
general and consul of the early third century B.C.,
notable, to later Romans, as a model of the integrity and
simplicity which marked the mores of earlier days, as an
example of a man whom he and his contemporaries
have never seen, but love. As the tale is told, Fabricius
resisted attempts to bribe him; thus, in spite of his high
offices, he died poor; provision had to be made for his
daughter out of funds of the state.
Women such as Fabricius' daughter could suffer or
enjoy a fate created by the virtue of fathers and husbands in politics and war, but they were not, for Cicero,
ordinarily active participants in these realms. They
were not the stuff out of which friends could be made.
Cicero held to the notion that women were by nature
weak and light-minded (infirmitas sexus and levitas
animi), although his experience of his first wife, Terentia, should have made him doubt this belief. In his own
time, some aristocratic women did take an active part in
Roman political life, but none of them were models of
political virtue for Cicero; he retained his admiration for
the manners and morals of the early Romans, who, with
some exceptions, reserved the worlds of politics and
war to men.
Eros, too, prevents wives and husbands from being
true friends. Although friendship meant devotion, for
Cicero, and a delight in being together, it is not an erotic
relation, nor one in which eros is welcome. He disapproves of the homosexual friendships of Greek culture
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to which some Romans of his own time were drawn.
Homosexual intercourse is unnatural, says Cicero
(Tusculan Disputations). The poet Ennius writes that
" s h a m e ' s beginning is the stripping of men's bodies
o p e n l y " ; Cicero agrees: the shameful practice of
homosexual friendship had its origin, he thinks, "in the
Greek gymnasia" (Tusculans 4. 70).
In general, he suspects sexuality, including the love
of a man for a women, " t o which nature has granted
wider tolerance" than it has to male homosexuality
(Tusculans 4. 71). In sexual pleasure and sexual longing, we lose the temperate, peaceful, and equable mood
which the wise man seeks to have at all times (Tusculans 4. 30ff). He condemns Aristotle and the Peripatetics, who say that there is a proper place in our life for
the agitated movement of our soul if they are not excessive. This view, he says, "must be regarded as weak
and effeminate," mollis et enervata. "Those who are
transported with delight at the enjoyment of sexual
pleasures are degraded," he writes; "those who covet
them with feverish soul are criminal. . . . In fact, the
whole passion ordinarily termed love [amor] . . . is of
such exceeding triviality that I see nothing that I think
comparable with it" (Tusculans 4. 38-39, 68). It is
worse than trivial, for it leads us to do foolish and
dishonorable things.
In their conception of marriage love, the Puritans
reject Cicero's attitude toward women, friendship, and
sexuality. Husband and wife are to be the best of
friends; sensuality and sexuality are to be integral parts
of this friendship: friendship and erotic romance go
hand in hand. The unselfish devotion that men were to
have for each other in the Ciceronian tradition must
give way, not to a new world of unqualified egoism
toward all, but to a kind of friendship with one's wife
that was never called for by the Roman senator.
In this notion of marriage love, many of the themes of
classical and medieval texts on friendship, including
some of Cicero's, are retained or given new form. The
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Puritans do not think that a major element of the
friendship between husband and wife is the mutual encouragement to honorable action in politics and war,
yet they do conceive of marriage friendship as one
which should ethically and spiritually nourish husband
and wife, whatever their callings. Then again, while
Cicero does not make the usefulness of friends in practical matters the fundamental principle of friendship, he
does give it a place: your true friends will help you in
politics and business if they can. The Puritans, too, see
husband and wife as joined in practical affairs, though
not matters of state; let the reader recall Gataker's
comment that woman was made to be a " y o a k e - f e l l o w "
as well as a " p l a y - f e l l o w " to man, a "fellow labourer
. . . in the managing o f . . . domestical! and household
affairs."
Some notions are lost. Cicero thought friends must
nourish each other in the realm of letters, manners,
conversation, and thought, in short, in the realm of
urbane culture. 1 9 The Puritans did not think that marriage had this purpose, nor, for that matter, did Cicero,
which may be one more reason why he did not think of
marriage as a kind of friendship. There are some startling new notions, as well, in the Puritan idea of marriage friendship. The same Puritans who believed that
husband and wife should concern themselves with the
ethical and spiritual character of their spouse also believed that one of the greatest goods of life is being loved
by one's spouse. This love is a great good not because it
leads our husband or wife to lavish great lifts on us, or
do whatever we say, but because the love itself is comforting: someone cares for us, delights in us; we are no
longer alone in the world. In the works of Aristotle,
Cicero, and in the New Testament, this is a theme that is
hardly to be found, if at all: it is a great good to be loved
by another human; above all, it is a great good for a
man, if he is loved by a woman, and a great good for a
woman, if she is loved by a man. This idea is a foundation of the Puritan theory of marriage.
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Much of this idea is found in Jeremy T a y l o r ' s
thought. Objecting to the exalted belief that we should
love a friend only for his virtue and not for what we hope
from him, Taylor (1662: 29-31) writes, "although I love
my friend because he is worthy, yet he is not worthy if
he can do no good." But what kind of good? True, " h e
is onely fit to be chosen for a friend who can give me
counsel, or defend my cause, or guide me right, or
relieve me, or can and will, when I need it, do me good:
onely this I adde: into the heapes of doing good, I will
reckon" loving me, " f o r it is a pleasure to be beloved."
Marriage is the model of all other human friendships,
for in no other relation with a man or woman, can we be
loved so well.
In a full-scale attempt to see Puritan ideas of marriage
as part of the history of friendship, both in idea and
practice, we should not ignore Montaigne, who shares
much with Cicero. As far as friendship goes, none of
" t h e four ancient forms of association—natural, social,
hospitable, erotic," writes Montaigne, " c o m e up to
real friendship, either separately, or together." The
love of woman "is more active, more scorching, and
more intense" than that of true friendship. " B u t it is an
impetuous and fickle flame, undulating and variable a
fever flame, subject to fits and lulls, that holds only by
one corner. In friendship it is a general and universal
warmth, moderate and even, besides a constant and
settled warmth, all gentleness and smoothness, with
nothing bitter and stinging about it" (Essais, I, 28 ["De
l'amitie"]; English translation, 1958: 136-137).
M o n t a i g n e t h i n k s t h a t the logics of d e s i r e in
friendship and in our love of women are quite different.
Adopting the view so characteristic of the Roman poet
Martial, Montaigne thinks that a man's full possession
of a woman destroys his desire for her: "la jouyssance
le p e r d " ; we become satiated, uninterested. 2 0 Friendship is different; the more it is enjoyed, the more it is
desired. The pleasure of a woman's friendship must
thus deprive a man of his desire for her: to the extent
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol3/iss3/4
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that he desires her, she must not be his, but what is the
pleasure of her friendship without his secure knowledge
of her love for him?
But what of marriage, which is supposed to be a
stable relation? A man cannot even hope that he and his
wife will be friends, for friendship must be freely given,
but marriage "is a bargain to which only the entrance is
free—its continuance being constrained and forced,
depending btherwise than on our will—and a bargain
ordinarily made for other e n d s . " Montaigne adds that
women are not ordinarily suited for friendship. They
commonly lack the " c a p a c i t y " (perhaps he means the
powers of spirit and mind) which sustain the "communion and fellowship" of friendship; " n o r does their
soul seem firm enough to endure the strain of so tight
and durable a k n o t " (Essais, I, 28; English translation,
1958: 138). Who can be surprised that the same Montaigne who devotes a remarkable essay to the memory
of his friend, Etienne de la Boetie, makes but little and
passing mention of his wife? The distance between
Montaigne and the Puritans is great: I need only mention the extraordinary records of conjugal devotion left
by Richard Baxter (1681), in his memoir of his wife, and
by Lucy Hutchinson, in her memoir of her husband,
written for the sake of her children. 21
Ill

Benjamin Nelson (1969: 139-164), in his extraordinary essay on the history of friendship in the West, says
that the older ideal of an unselfish devotion of a man to
his friend gave way, in early modern Europe, to a new
view, unsympathetic to this devotion. He believes this
shift in attitude is part of a larger passage in the West
from the older world views of "tribal brotherhood" to
the newer one of "universal otherhood," not universal
brotherhood. The older idea of friendship, in which
devotion was but to one or a few, did not become a basis
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for a new and triumphal view in which devotion was to
be given to even wider human groups; it was not successfully universalised. Instead, the idea of friendship
came under attack and was ultimately replaced by an
ethic which emphasised the disciplined pursuit of one's
own personal good.
The belief that a man should stand surety for a friend
in need, even if this means the risk of all his wealth, is
often part of medieval and Renaissance ideas of
friendship. We find it dramatically and profoundly developed in Shakespeare's Merchant of Venice. Nelson
describes sixteenth-century attacks on this expression
of unlimited devotion to one's friend, the most striking of which is Luther's (1524; quoted in Nelson,
1969: 152): "Standing surety is a work that is too lofty
for a man; it is unseemly, for it is presumptuous and an
invasion of God's rights. For . . . the scriptures bid us
to put our trust and place our reliance on no man, but
only on God; for human nature is false, vain, deceitful,
and unreliable." In this matter, Luther finds an ally in
Sir Walter Raleigh (1751: II, 351-352; quoted in Nelson,
1969: 147-148), who tells his son,
. . . suffer not thyself to be wounded for other men's faults, and
scourged for other men's offences, which is the surety of another;
for thereby millions of men have been beggared and destroyed,
paying the reckoning of other men's riot, and the charge of other
men's folly and prodigality; if thou smart, smart for thine o w n
sins; and, above all things, be not made to carry the burdens of
other men: if any friend desire thee to be his surety, give him a part
of what thou hast to spare; if he press the further, he is not they
friend at all . . .

No doubt, Nelson is right to say that in early modern
Europe, the belief that friends ought to be devoted to
one another without limit gave way, in the realm of
commerce, to the belief that we ought to be governed by
principles of rational business practice at all times, and
make no exceptions on grounds of love or affection.
The harshness of the world of commerce is not qualified
by the idea that man should be a friend to man. The
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claims of friendship do not disappear from the world,
however; indeed, in the sphere of marriage, they become more powerful than they ever were. In economic
life, tribal brotherhood gives way to universal otherhood, but in the realm of marriage, the belief in
brotherhood and friendship moves forward. It is sad
that the aristocratic idea of friendship among males
could not become a norm governing all human relations, among all human beings, in all spheres of life. It
did not simply give way, however, to another ethic in
which friendship had no place; it would be better to say
that the idea of friendship among males gave way to the
love b e t w e e n h u s b a n d and wife. The claims of
friendship remained circumscribed in their application,
"tribal," but they made their home, and they still make
their home, in one of the most common relations of
modern life. The world of commerce lost some of the
restraints that might have mitigated its harshness, but
the world of marriage gained an ethic, which if heeded
at all, makes it more humane.
In a later essay, Nelson (1974: 94-95) takes account
of some of these developments: " t o o few seem to perceive that in the medieval world and in the early modern world—prior, actually, to the Puritans—a full religious sacralization of the family or family property
did not exist. There did, indeed, not occur the sacralization of what might be called the special friendship with one's own wife." He interprets the Puritan
call for friendship with one's spouse, however, in a
curious way: it is "the sacralization of a collective
egoism of the family and its property." It is thus far
from the idea of male friendship in antiquity and the
middle ages, which Nelson says " w a s conceived as the
union that transcended all calculation and egotism
whether of family or of person. From at least the time of
Plato forward, the moralists and novelists insisted on
preeminence of friendship, going so far as to deny that
one's wife or members of one's family could truly be
friends in the highest sense."
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This is a prejudiced reading of friendship's twists
and turns in history. Puritan marriage love is no more a
collective egoism than the friendship among virtuous
men espoused by Cicero. Cicero does call for a collective egoism among friends, for friends ought to favor
each other over others. At the same time, this alliance
has its limits: friends must not ask each other to do
what is shameful; as we know, they must be exemplars
of virtue to one another {De Amicitia 26, 35-40). The
union of man and wife in Puritan thought is no less
ethical.
IV
In the foregoing, I have described features of some
seventeenth-century theories of marriage which bear
significantly upon our understanding of contemporary
American attitudes toward the union of man and wife.
If we look to Locke's Treatises of Government, however, we will find the complex of ideas just described. 22 Locke, like Puritan and other seventeenthcentury writers on marriage, believed that an agreement to marry had the character of a contract. 2 3 He
was unlike them in thinking that spouses themselves
should, in principle, have a great deal of latitude in
setting the terms of this contract. Their freedom is not
unlimited, for marriage does have natural purposes;
spouses may not set terms which would impede their
achievement. Marriage's chief purpose is " t h e continuation of the Species." This purpose, writes Locke, is
not fulfilled simply by "Procreation"; it requires that
"young Ones" be nourished and supported "till they
are able to shift and provide for themselves." "Inheritance," too, must be "taken care f o r " (Treatises, II,
§§ 79, 81). 24 A man and a woman who have taken on
this purpose by marrying must therefore remain together until all this is accomplished.
Locke also says that parental care and support is a
"Right" of children; once created, a child has a righthttps://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol3/iss3/4
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ful claim to aid " f r o m his Parents" (Treatises, §§78,
80). "Inheritance," too, is a " N a t u r a l " right of children (see Treatises, I, §§ 91-93), so their rights extend
even beyond their youth; they have a claim against
their parents as adults. These rights of children also
mean that husband and wife must stay together. But
for how long? When children can stand on their own
two feet, when, moreover, their inheritance has been
taken care of, Locke sees no inherent reason why the
marriage compact " m a y not be made determinable,"
that is, of limited duration, to end "either by consent,
or at a certain time, or upon certain Conditions." This
would make it like other " v o l u n t a r y C o m p a c t s , "
which need not be made for life. There is no necessity
in the nature of marriage, " n o r to the ends of it, that it
should always be for Life" (Treatises, II, 81). 25 Indeed, beyond the natural purposes of marriage, which
bind the partners to certain terms, the ends of marriage
should be set by the partners themselves: the terms of
a marriage contract should answer the particular interest of those who wed.
Laslett notes that Locke was prepared to go even
further than this. In his Journal, Locke made notes for
the rules of a society based on reason alone, which he
named "Atlantis." In this society, " h e that is already
married may marry another woman with his left
hand. . . . the ties, duration and conditions of the left
hand marriage shall be no other that what is expressed
in the contract of marriage between the parties."
(Locke, 1679: 199; quoted in Laslett's edition of
Treatises, 1963: 364, note to § 81). Perhaps he thinks
that since the business of procreation is taken care of
by the husband's first marriage, the parties to the second, "left hand" marriage are free to design their marriage as they wish.)
The difference between Locke's attitude and that of
the Puritans can be readily seen if we compare the
implicit theory of divorce and remarriage in Locke's
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Second Treatise with the explicit theory in Milton's
tracts on divorce. From the point of view of pure reason, Locke thinks, mutual willingness to part is, within
limits, sufficient to justify a complete divorce: a divorce which permits both parties to remarry. The reasons why they wish to part are not relevant; their wish
to do so is enough. Parental obligations alone limit this
freedom.
No Puritan writer shared this attitude; all strictly
limited the grounds of divorce (Johnson, 1970). Most
restricted these grounds to adultery and desertion;
some argued that these grounds do not even permit a
complete divorce, but only a separation; even the innocent party does not have the right to remarry. Milton was far bolder. Like many of his Puritan colleagues, he believes that the fundamental purposes of
marriage are mutual support and comfort. 2 6 He therefore concludes that if differences in temperament between spouses make the fulfillment of this purpose impossible, divorce ought to be permitted, offering the
opportunity of remarriage to both parties, although he
leaves it up to the husband alone to decide whether a
divorce shall occur. To yoke together a man and a
woman who cannot give each other the warmth and
comfort that marriage should give condemns them to a
miserable life; to force them to maintain such a union
defeats the purpose of marriage itself. Milton's argument that spouses may divorce when they are temperamentally incompatible reveals an attitude strikingly
different from Locke's; for Milton argues his case in the
light of the specific purposes of marriage. Spouses are
not at liberty to aim at whatever ends they wish, but
must guide themselves by the purposes of marriage as
they are revealed by scripture and natural reason.
Locke and the Puritan theorists of marriage differ in
other ways as well. Locke says that husbands should
have the final say in marital disputes over things held
in common, for the final decision having to be made by
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someone, "it naturally falls to the Man's share, as the
abler and the stronger" (Treatises, II, § 82). This subjection, however, is not basic to Locke's notion of
marriage. We would not be far from his own viewpoint
if we urgued that husband and wife are equal and autonomous partners in marriage. In arguing for this,
however, we would be far from the attitude of the
Puritans, who make much of the submission of women
to their husbands. We may therefore favor Locke; to
be fair, let us keep in mind his failure to develop any
conception of the emotional side of marriage as the
Puritans do.
Clearly, there are Lockean currents in modern
American conceptions of marriage: that husband and
wife should meet each other as equals is one; that the
interests and inclinations of husband and wife should
be decisive in determining the character and objects of
marriage is another. But in other respects, we might do
better to look to the Puritan writers to find a source of
some of our ideas of marriage. Four of their beliefs
stand out in this respect: (1) that a chief end, or the
chief end, of marriage is mutual support and comfort;
(2) that sexual and sensual delight is essential to that
comfort; (3) that husband and wife must also be the
best of friends; (4) that this delight and friendship must
last; neither may wane with the years.
V
In view of these ideas, how are we to evaluate Max
Weber's belief that the "decisive characteristic" of the
Puritans was their "asceticism" which "turned with all
its force against one thing: the spontaneous enjoyment
of life and all it had to o f f e r " (Weber, 1920: I, 183;
English translation, 1958: 166-167)? Much depends on a
precise understanding of what Weber thinks asceticism
is: a systematic self-discipline in feeling, intention, and
action; which, if successful, means " t h e destruction of
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spontaneous, impulsive enjoyment." In the creation of
such a discipline, writes Weber, lies " t h e great historical significance of Western monasticism." It
. . . developed a systematic method of rational conduct with the
purpose of overcoming the status naturae, to free man from the
power of irritational impulses and his dependence on the world
and on nature. It attempted to subject man to the supremacy of a
purposeful will, to bring his actions under constant self-control
with a careful consideration of their ethical consequences . . .this
active self-control. . . was also the most important practical ideal
of Puritanism. . . . like every rational type of asceticism, [it] tried
to enable a man to maintain and act upon his constant motives,
especially those which it taught him itself, against the emotions.
In this formal psychological sense of the term, it tried to make him
into a personality. Contrary to many popular ideas, the end of this
asceticism was to be able to lead an alert, intelligent life: the most
urgent task the destruction of spontaneous, impulsive enjoyment.
The most important means [by which this asceticism achieved its
end] was by bringing order into the conduct of its adherents
(Weber, 1920: I, 116: English translation, which I have slightly
modified, 1958: 118-119).

Weber is certainly correct in saying that the Puritan
tried to make man " a personality," that is, sought to
make him a being who acts "upon his constant motives" in all spheres of life, at all times. But the logic of
self-control in the Puritan psychology of daily life is
varied; it does not always involve hostility to spontaneous impulse in the name of psychic " o r d e r " and "methodical control," as Weber thinks (1920: I, 118; English translation, 1958: 119). In the case of married life,
the Puritans called for an integration of ethics and impulse, constancy and spontaneity. The life of duty is a
life of discipline, yet they make the spontaneous (and
erotic) delight in one's spouse a duty of married life.
Mutual delight in one another is not simply desirable, it
is required: husband and wife together must make this a
reality. 27
Some might consider this odd, for how can one make
such love a duty"? Can romantic love truly be governed
with the same rigor as the more emotionally neutral
benevolence of eighteenth-century humanitarianism?
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From the point of view of Kant, and many contemporary moral philosophers, " o u g h t " implies " c a n . "
Thus, love is beyond the rule of morals if it is wholly,
and naturally, outside of our control. If it is so, then a
fusion of ethics and eros in marriage love is beyond our
control as well. This is Weber's conviction; like many
German intellectuals and artists of the twentieth century, he thinks that rational self-discipline is no friend of
erotic spontanaeity: they are in harmony only in exceptional circumstances. 2 8 " R a r e l y , " writes Weber (1920,
I: 563; English translation, 1946: 350), does life grant us
the fusion of the two "in pure f o r m . " " H e to whom it is
given may speak of fate's fortune and grace—not of his
own merit."
VI
The Puritans understood that there was something
beyond reason's control in the love which must be
found in marriage. It is mysterious, writes Rogers
(1642: 147-148), as the
. . . league offriendship, wherein w e s e e G o d doth soorderit, that
by a secret instinct of love and sympathy, causing the heart of one
to incline to the other, two friends have beene as one spirit in two
bodies, as not only w e see in Jonathan and David, but in heathens
which have striven to lay downe their lives for the safeguard of
each other. . . . oftimes a reason cannot be given by either partie,
why they should be so tender each to other: it being caused not by
any profitable or pleasurable meane, but by mere sympathy,
which is farre the more and noble cement of union, than what else
so ever.

There is a similar mystery at the heart of marriage love.
Its causes are largely hidden and unknown; hence beyond our control: " t h e elme and the vine doe naturally
so entwine and embrace each other, that its called, the
friendly elme; who can tell why? much more then in
reasonable creatures, it must be s o . " 2 9 Rogers even
celebrates marriage love's distance from the dictates of
cool judgement: "through this instrument of sympathie
. . . two consent together to become husband and
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wife," setting all others aside, although they are "more
amiable in themselves, more rich, better bred, and the
like." It must not be our own doing, but God's.
Others did not go this far, but agreed that love is
rooted in temperamental affinities which we cannot
rule. 30 If we are wrongly joined, happiness is beyond
our reach. Puritan casuists therefore counselled their
readers to make a very careful choice of partner. It is
not necessary to be deeply in love to marry, but a real
likelihood that such love will develop is necessary. No
one ought to marry a person he thinks he cannot, or is
not likely, to love. This sense of one's affinity to a
proposed spouse is of greater importance than the
wishes of one's own parents, weighty as those are. 3 1
In A Midsummer Night's Dream, Hermia loves Ly Sander, as he loves her; Helena loves Demetrius, who loves
not her, but Hermia. Yet once touched with the juice of
Oberon's magic herb, Lysander has eyes only for
Helena; a sign, he thinks, of his good judgment, for he
says to his new-found love that " T h e will of man is by
his reason sway'd;/And reason says you are the worthier maid" (Midsummer Night's Dream 2.2. 115-116).
With further application of the juice of the same herb,
Demetrius comes to love Helena. Oberon's Titania
even comes to love Bottom, with his ass's head. Titania
tells Bottom she loves him, but Bottom replies,
"Methinks, mistress, you should have little reason for
that. And yet, to say the truth, reason and love have
little company together now-a-days" (Ibid., 3. 1. 142144). The happy resolution of the romantic tangles of A
Midsummer Night's Dream are not solved by reason
giving love its orders: we must have eyes for one another to love, but this is no work of reason: Oberon
claims back Titania's love by another touch of her eyes.
It is sweet magic, not cool logic, that does the trick.
Temperament is basic, but it is not all: Spouses can
cultivate their delight in each other. The Puritans saw
this cultivation as daily responsibility of spouses: " P u t
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c a s e , " writes Rogers (1642: 156), that "thou hadst
grounds of first love to thy companion: what then?
thinkst thou that this edge will holde without dayly
whetting?" To help couples keep the edge on their
marriage love, Puritan writers offer practical advice:
Gouge, (1626: 133-134), for example, tells us that "owrward mutual peace" is " o n e of the principall. . .means
of maintaining an inward loving affection betwixt Man
and Wife"; they should therefore "avoid offence"; if it
is given, they should pass it by: " L e t them suffer their
own will to be crossed, rather than discontent be given
to the other." If both be incensed together, "offer reconciliation"; if it is offered, accept it. Do not bring
"children, servants," or others "in the family" into
your frays. Do not compare your spouse to another.
" B e e not jealous." "Endavour to please one another."
Counseling husbands, Baxter (1678: II, 41) says,
" M a k e not the infirmities" of your wives " t o seem
odious faults, but excuse them as far as you lawfully
may, by considering the frailty of the Sex . . . and
considering also your own infirmities, and how much
your Wives must bear with y o u . "
Like the sharpening of a knife, however, the Puritan's advice on cultivating marriage love tends to be
superficial, inadequate to the task of enabling us to be
husbands and wives who are the deepest of loves and
the best of friends. For the demands upon us are very
high in this idea of marriage, even when we are married
to someone to whom we are temperamentally suited.
Not many of us find it easy to achieve what the Puritans
say we must. There are many reasons for this; I shall
note two rather general ones: first, there is in many of
us, a great deal of mistrust and fear of those we love or
want to love; often there is a great deal of anger and
defensiveness toward them as well. At least in part,
these attitudes have their source in our experience of
our own family when we were children; this past makes
it difficult for us, as spouses, to nourish and maintain
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the required love of our husbands or wives. In addition,
those we love, or seek to love, may have a similar
mistrust or fear. They thus may not find it easy to
accept, indeed, may actively discourage, our expressions of love and affection.
Such fears and defensiveness are not easily gotten at
through the means the Puritans advise us to use. Beyond this, their notion that wives ought to forego expressions of anger hardly seems appropriate to a marriage in which wives as well as husbands are to receive
deep forms of comfort and support from their partners.
Anger is a natural occurrence from time to time in any
close relation; if we repeatedly ignore it, believing we
ought to be docile, it does not thereby go away, at least
not in ordinary cases, but reveals itself in a variety of
ways; for example, in a generally bad temper, pervasive
coldness, or loss of interest.
Moreover, the Puritans' emphasis on the unique
friendship of marriage poses problems. They call upon
husband and wife to be the best of friends, but they do
not call upon each spouse to have close and intense
friendships with anyone else. This is unwise. Perhaps
our spouse should be our best friend, and the only one
with whom we have sex, but it is difficult to develop a
friendship and sustain it, if all our (emotional) eggs are
in one basket. The penalty we pay if our trust is misplaced is too great, for we have no one to turn to if our
best friend, our husband or wife, fails us in some way:
no one to turn to but the very source of our sorrow. It is
possible to nourish a friendship on this basis, but it
seems to me difficult.
These difficulties can be removed. Husbands and
wives can give up the notion that men must rule and
women submit. We can develop strong friendships with
others, so that there will be others to whom we can turn
in times of marriage trouble. But more general difficulties remain. We cannot easily heal the psychic wounds
that disable us from loving our spouses or accepting
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their love, for these injuries lie deep. They are found in
parts of our psyche that do not commonly respond to
sage words of advice, nor are they removed by the
peremptory demands of conscience.
We might therefore conclude that the Puritan demands are impossibly high, since very many of us cannot fulfill the duties of marriage they describe without a
deep personal transformation that is surely not to be
accomplished by following the kind of advice they give
to spouses who don't come up to snuff. But the Puritan
conceptions of marriage have not died out; my own
impression is that they are very much alive in the
United States. It is a commonplace of nineteenth and
twentieth-century America that the family is supposed
to be a haven in a heartless world, an island of ease and
sweetness in the midst of an unforgiving world of commerce and industry, an oasis away from the "work
ethic." For many of us, perhaps, it has been the other
way around: doing well in business is easy compared to
what is expected of us at home. 3 3 Perhaps this is why
some of us work so hard: we can do so much better in
career than we can do at home, where the claims of
intimacy, friendship, and true love loom so large. Work
is a haven from a home asking more than our hearts, or
our spouses" hearts, can give.
Perhaps Puritan notions of marriage also account for
some of the popularity of psychoanalysis and allied
therapies in this country during the last half-century, for
in the American context, these therapies have held out
the promise of enabling men and women to meet the
demands of marriage (or similar non-legal relations)
more successfully. 3 4 It is curious that American
psychotherapy, so often seen as hostile to "Puritanism," in fact often serves this Puritan end. Indeed,
for some, therapy becomes the test of whether a marriage is to continue or not. 3 5 If a marriage is in trouble,
one or both spouses seek therapy; if, after due time,
they still cannot provide each other with the needed
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warmth and comfort, then they think a divorce justified.
For they believe that nothing more can be done. The
temperamental failings lie too deep to be cured.
In retrospect, it appears that the Puritan demands
upon spouses were not matched by the means which
they gave to married couples to meet these demands. A
similar situation may be still true today. Nonetheless,
we might attribute at least some of the popularity of
psychotherapies in the United States to their ability (or
presumed ability) to make us what we should be as
husbands and wives. In any case, if we want to look at
the sources of some of the present perplexities of marriage, we had better look not only at Locke, but at
Gouge, Gataker, Rogers, and their colleagues. The Puritans were fanatic about many things, including marriage; at least in this area, many of us continue a devotion to their demands, although we are not so sure about
how well we are able to meet them.
Queens College, City University of New York, and the
Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton
NOTES
*I thank the many who commented on this paper for their help.
Frequent conversations with Fred Lipschitz and Susan Leites, my
wife, have provided me with much food for thought. T w o texts
stand out as insightful introductions to Puritan theories of marriage: Levin Schiicking's Die Puritanische
Familie in literarsoziologischer
Sicht (1964; English translation, 1969) and William
and Malleville Haller's "The Puritan Art of L o v e " (1941-1942).

'

'Those who were Puritan in the ways described divided on the
details of their ethics, belief, rite, and piety, and on other matters
as well. The legitimacy of clerical authority and, more generally,
of all hierarchies of wealth and power was a great point of contention. For an interesting discussion of this issue at the end of the
Interregnum, see Reay (1978). For a discussion of the meaning of
'Puritan' in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, see Hall
(1965). Much, too, can be learned from Kavolis (1979).
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2

I n D e Bono Coniugale (3. 3), Augustine writes that the marriage of
old people must have some other purpose than procreation: it is
the good of "mutual companionship between the two s e x e s " (/'«
diversu sexu societatem).
This notion of companionship as a good
is omitted, however, in his general statements in this work concerning the good of marriage (Noonan, 1965: 128).
3
It lives, too, in Noonan's Contraception
(1965), an excellent and
subtle work.
4
Taylor (1657: 81-82) disagrees with the Puritans on this point. In
his estimation of celibacy, he is close to Bellarmine. He praises a
chaste widowhood, but reserves his highest esteem for the virginal
life: It is "a life of Angels": "being unmingled with the world, it is
apt to converse with God: and by not feeling the warmth of a too
forward and indulgent nature, flames out with holy fires, till it be
burned like the Cherubim . . . Natural virginity of itself is not a
state more acceptable to God: but that which is chosen and voluntary in order to the conveniences of Religion and separation
from worldly incumbrances, is therefore better than the married
life; . . . it is a freedom from cares, an opportunity to spend more
time in spiritual imployment; . . . it containeth in it a victory over
lusts, and great desires of Religion and self-denial, and therefore is
more excellent than the married life." It allows, as Taylor says
elsewhere (1655: 222), "a perfect mortification of our strongest
appetites."
Self-mortification is a well-developed theme in both the Puritan
and Roman Catholic worlds of the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries, but the Puritans do not make much of self-mortification
through the denial of the sexuality which belongs to marriage love,
a love both spiritual and yet sensual, a love which leads couples to
marry and sustains them once married. For this reason. Max
Weber's characterization of Puritansim as an "inner-worldly asceticism" is misleading. The Puritans do call for mortification of
sexual desire when illicit, but they call for an integration of sexuality of husband and wife with other elements of the good and holy
life. T h e y t h e r e f o r e reject the admiration of s e x u a l selfmortification found in the Roman Church of the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries, for example, in authors as different as
Ignatius of Loyola and Pascal. Weber is plainly wrong when he
writes that "the sexual asceticism of Puritanism differs only in
degree, not in fundamental principle," from that of Western medieval monasticism. (Weber, 1920: I, 169-170; English translation,
1958: 158).
In this matter, the case of Baxter is instructive. Unlike most of
the Puritans who wrote about marriage, and in spite of the spiritual
support he received from his wife, he thought the single life gen-
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erally more suitable to the main ends of the Christian life. These
ends are three: to "'serve G o d , " advance our "spiritual welfare,"
and increase our " H o l i n e s s e . " Yet he does not praise those who
choose the chaste single life for their sexual renunciation, nor does
he list the sexual aspect of marriage as one of its spiritual disadvantages. In the main, his objection is that marriage creates so
many worldly cares and concerns that it easily impedes both the
active and contemplative elements of the Christian life, a theme
well-known in the writings of the Roman Church, but linked in that
tradition to an admiration of sexual renunciation (Baxter, 1678: II,
3-12).
5
For a like passage, see Rogers (1642: 6). Seeker (1658: 17) writes,
"One of the Popes of Rome, sprinkles this unholy drop" upon
marriage: "carnis polutionem & immunditiem."
"It's strange,"
says Seeker, "that that should be a pollution, which was instituted
before corruption: or that impurity, which was ordained in the
state of innocency."
6
S e e Gataker (1620: 37).
T o r a similar use of this passage, see Griffith (1634: 280-281, 286)
and Baster (1678: II, 42).
8
For similar remarks, see Gouge (1626: 239-241).
9
A l s o see Gataker (1620: 44) and Gouge (1626: 134).
,0
F o r a like passage, see Gataker (1620: 44).
Lucy Hutchinson (1965: 18-19), wife of a Puritan soldier, herself a Puritan, and brought up in a Puritan household, begins her
description of the physical appearance of her late husband in the
following way, in a memoir of him prepared for the benefit of their
children: " H e was of middle stature, of a slender and exactly
well-proportioned shape in all parts, his complexion fair, his hair
of light brown, very thick set in his youth, softer than the finest
silk, and curling into loose great rings at the ends; his eyes of a
lively grey, well-shaped and full of life and vigor, graced with
many becoming motions; his visage thin, his mouth well made, his
lips very ruddy and graceful, although the nether chap shut over
the upper, yet it was in such a manner as was not unbecoming; his
teeth were even and white as the purest ivory, his chin was
something long, and the mould of his face: his forehead was not
very high; his nose was raised and sharp; but withal he had a most
amiable countenance, which carried in it something of magnanimity and majesty mixed with sweetness, that at the same time
bespoke love and awe in all that saw him: his skin was smooth and
white, his legs and feet excellently well-made; he was quick in his
pace and turns, nimble and active and graceful in all his motions;
he was apt for any bodily exercise, and any that he did became
him; he could dance admirably well, but neither in youth nor riper
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years made any practice of i t . . . " She goes on to describe other
admirable qualities, including those he possessed in music, dress,
and wit. A separate and major section of her memoir is devoted to
his moral and spiritual virtues.
Her description of her husband, no doubt, o w e s much to modes
of thought and perception that do not have their origins in Puritan
culture. She is familiar with elements of the culture of the court,
which owed much to the aristocratic manners and arts of the
Continent. Her father was a gentleman who had spent time at
court; she herself grew up in the precincts of the Tower of London,
"whereof her father" had been "made lieutenant" (Hutchinson,
1965: 10).
She writes of herself as a child, "I thought it no sin to learn or
hear witty songs and amorous sonnets or poems, and twenty
things of that kind, wherein I was so apt that 1 became the confidant in all the loves that were managed among my mother's young
w o m e n " (Hutchinson, 1965: 15). These sonnets or poems were
not of Puritan origin, yet they were shared and sung in a Puritan
household; as a grown woman, she disapproves of them, yet her
own description shows that when she seeks to express her love of
her husband, she still favors the amorous style learned in her
youth.
The literature of knightly romance—Amadis of Gaul and the
like—so popular in Elizabethan and Stuart England, even among
the pious, also taught the Puritans something about the passion of
love. (To assuage the conscience of the pious reader, the stories
were often given a moral veneer; see Wright [1935].) Such literature is less in evidence in seventeenth-century N e w England,
though it is by no means absent (see Wright, 1957: 141-144). For
an amusing use of the literary style of the romance in early
eighteenth-century N e w England, see the journal of Sarah Kemble Knight first published in 1825; for a twentieth-century edition,
see Knight (1920). A lively excerpt is published in Miller and
Johnson (1963: II, 425-447).
The literature of romance, as developed in the more refined
forms of English poetry, may have also played a part in encouraging the flowering of romantic notions of marriage love among the
Puritans. John Leverett, later to be president of Harvard College,
while still a student, copied out several stanzas from Cowley's
" E l e g i e u p o n A n a c r e o n " and " T h e M i s t r e s s . " Elnathan
Chauncy, son of Harvard's President Charles Chauncy, copied
out lyrics of both Herrick, including most of "Gather ye rosebuds
while ye m a y , " and Spenser; he gave twenty pages of his
notebook to the latter poet (Morison, 1936: 46-52). Milton was not
the only Puritan who read Spenser.
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For the Spenserian background of Milton's thoughts on marriage love, see Haller (1946). For a complex and sophisticated
discussion of ideas of marriage, love, and sexuality in Spenser and
in Shakespeare, see Watkins (1950).
1
'Puritan writers often turned to the Song of Songs to illustrate the
love that a husband must have for a wife, and a wife f o r a husband,
as the Hallers have noted (1941-1942: 243). See, above all, Rogers
(1642: 313); also Perkins (1616-1618: III, 691); Gouge (1626);
Griffith (1634: 289); and Milton (1645a: 335). For further documentation of the place of sexual love in marriage, as it is seen by
Puritans who affirm its place in no uncertain terms, see Frye
(1955).
Not all Puritans emphasise the sexual and sensual delight of
marriage love. William Perkins does not make much of it. True, he
says that "the Communion of man and w i f e " is a duty which
"consisteth principally in the performance of speciall benevolence to one another, and that not of courtesie, but of due debt."
Spouses must show "a singular and entire affection towards one
another," among other ways, "by an holy kind of rejoycing and
solacing themselves with each other, in a mutual declaration of the
signes and tokens of love and kindness." To support his position,
he quotes, in addition to Proverbs 5: 18, 19, Song of Songs 1. 1:
"Let him kiss mee with the kisses of his mouth, for thy love is
better than wine." On the other hand, Perkins does not say anything of this joyous, and sensuous intimacy in his discussion of the
ends of marriage, though he does say that mutual comfort is one of
them (Perkins, 1616-1618: III, 689, 691, 671).
Baxter, too, fails to make much of the sensual and sexual side of
marriage. He does tell husband and wife that they must take
delight in each other; he adds the comment that men are perverse
enough to turn "the lawful delight allowed them by God . . . into
loathing and disdain." This, they must not do: Proverbs 5: 18-19
must be their guide (Baxter, 1678: II, 42). Ye he does not make
the mutual delights and comforts of marriage a chief reason to
marry. We must marry if w e can serve God and ourselves better by
doing so; w e must marry if our parents require it of us (and there is
"no greater matter on the contrary to hinder it"); we must marry if
we are free to do so and "have not the gift of Continence.''
The
good of mutual support and comfort c o m e s in by the back door, in
answer to the question, "May the aged marry that are frigid,
Impotent, and uncapahle of procreation?
Answ. Yes, God hath
not forbidden them: And there are other lawful ends of marriage,
as mutual help and comfort &c. which may make it lawful" (Baxter, 1678: II, 3-4). It takes a question about the aged to make him
mention comfort as reason for marriage; he does not think that
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they are that interested in sexual delight: he quotes Bacon, who
says that wives are "old mens nurses"—a good enough reason for
an elderly man to marry. Baxter was less willing than others to
integrate the sexual with the affective, ethical, and even spiritual
elements of marriage.
With respect to sexuality in marriage, Baxter is thus sometimes
close to the anonymous author of The Practice of Christian
Graces or The Whole Duty of Man (1659: 168-169; quoted by
Schiicking, 1969: 23), an enormously popular guide to conduct in
late seventeenth-century England, the England of the Restoration. This author writes that in "lawful marriage . . . men are not
to think themselves let loose to please their brutish appetites, but
are to keep themselves within such rules of moderation, as agree
to the ends of Marriage, which [are]. . . the begetting of children,
and the avoiding of fornication."
The character of Baxter's thought and feeling perhaps misled
Weber in his judgment of Puritanism, for the sociologist takes
Baxter as an exemplar of Puritan attitudes toward marriage sexuality. Perhaps this is why Weber thinks that modern dissociations
of sexuality from the deeper dimensions of emotional life are
congenial to the Puritan sensibility. For the fortunate, Weber
thinks, there exists, beyond the realm of reason and cultural
demands, a life of desire, love, and passion, tragic in its irrationality, yet profoundly sustaining in its meaning. He abhorred the
"moderns" of his time who had no inkling of this darkly luminous
realm, who made sexuality a merely medical, physiological, or
hygienic phenomenon: a purely "rational" matter.
Writing of his own time, Weber remarks that "in a lecture, a
zealous adherent of hygienic prostitution—it was a question of the
regulation of brothels and prostitutes—defended the moral legitimacy of extra-marital intercourse (which was looked upon as
hygienically useful) by referring to its poetic justification in the
case of Faust and Margaret." Weber comments: "To treat Margaret as a prostitute and to fail to distinguish the powerful sway of
human passion from sexual intercourse for hygienic reasons, both
are thoroughly congenial to the Puritan standpoint." (Weber,
1920: I, 170, n. 1: English translation, 1958: 263-264). Weber is
mistaken; the Puritans understood and e v e n sanctified the
passionate desire and erotic longing for another which endowed
the Puritan marriage bed with life-meanings far deeper than those
captured by physiology. In marriage love, with its sexuality, we
find a true friend and companion, a second self: we are redeemed
from our loneliness. The Puritans would have condemned love
that joined Gretchen and Faust together, but they call for a love,
within marriage, no less deep and no less passionate.
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The "hygienic" view which Weber abhors was perhaps the
outlook of Bertrand Russell's mother and father. In his autobiography (1967-1969: I, 10), Russell writes that his parents obtained
for his brother "a tutor of some scientific ability," who was,
however, "in an advanced state of consumption." "Apparently
upon grounds of pure theory, my father and mother decided that
although he ought to remain childless on account of tuberculosis,
it was unfair to expect him to be celibate. My mother therefore
allowed him to live with her, though I know of no evidence that she
derived any pleasure from doing s o . "
12
See, for example, Rogers (1642: 200, 304-306).
13
See Gataker (1624: 20): "A Meeke and quiet spirit, in a woman
especially, is a thing, saith Saint Peter, much set by in Gods
sight." Gataker quotes from I Peter 3 . 4 .
,4
S e e . for example. A m e s (1639: 156) and Rogers: (1642: 236-253).
I5
See Rogers (1642: 220), who quotes Paul (I Timothy 5. 8): " H e
that provides not for his family hath forsaken the faith, and is
worse than an Infidell." For Rogers' extended reproof of improvident husbands, whom he divides into nine sorts, see 1642: 230236.
" S e e Rogers (1642: 288-296).
"Baxter (1681: 67) writes that he "never k n e w " the "equal" of his
wife's reason in "prudential practical"
matters: "in very hard
cases, about what was to be done, she would suddenly open all the
way that was to be opened, in things of the Family, Estate, or any
civil business. And to confess the truth, experience acquainted
her, that I knew less in such things than she; and therefore was
willing she should take it all upon her."
,8
A m e s (1639): tells us that a husband "ought to reckon of his Wife
in all things, as his neerest Companion, and as part of himselfe, or
of the same whole, in a certaine parity of honour."
"In answer to a letter from Appius Claudius Pulcher, who has just
returned to Rome, Cicero (Ad Familiares 3. 9. 1) writes, "At last,
after all, I have read a letter worthy of Appius Claudius—a letter
full of kindly feeling, courtesy, and consideration |plenas humanitatis, offici. diligentiae].
Evidently the very sight of your
urban surroundings has given you back your pristine urbanity."
Brunt (1965: 5) writes that "sermo" [conversation],
"litterae"
[letters, in the broad sense], and " h u m a n i t a s " were recognised in
Cicero's Rome "as qualities which might make even a disreputable man a welcome associate on whom the name of friend could be
bestowed."
20
Thus, for Martial, the difficulty of gaining a woman makes her
attractive; there must be some difficulty, else no desire can arise:
Moechus es Aufidiae. qui vir, Scaevine, fuisti;
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rivalis fuerat qui tuus, ille vir est.
cur aliena placet tibi, quae tua non placet, uxor?
numquid securus non potes arrigere? (Epigrams 3. 70)
In Ker's translation (Martial, 1919):
You are the paramour of Aufidia, and you were, Scaevinus, her
husband; he who was your rival is her husband. Why does
another man's wife please you when she as your own does not
please you? Is it that when secure you lack appetite?
For further examples of the same strain of thought in the Epigrams, see 1. 57 and 1. 73.
2,
F o r a recent edition of this, written after her husband's death in
1664, but not published until 1806, see Lucy Hutchinson, Memoirs
of Colonel Hutchinson (1965).
22
A careful reading of Locke's statements on marriage is found in
Shanley (1979).
" F o r one Puritan discussion of marriage as a contract, see Rogers
(1642: 96-126).
24
I quote throughout from Peter Laslett's edition of the Treatises
(1963), which is based on the third printing (1968), as corrected by
Locke. " I " and "II" indicate the First and Second
Treatises
respectively. I refer to the sections of the Treatises, rather than to
pages of Laslett's edition, for the convenience of readers who use
other editions.
25
Locke's view is a version of an argument rejected by the young
Thomas Aquinas in his commentary on the sentences of Peter
Lombard (Scriptum in IV Lihros Sententiarum 4. 33. 2. 1). "The
union of man and woman in marriage is chiefly directed to the
begetting, rearing, and instruction of offspring. But all things are
complete by a certain time. Therefore after that time it is lawful to
put away a wife without prejudice to the natural law." Thomas
replies, " B y the intention of nature marriage is directed to the
rearing of offspring, not merely for a time, but throughout its
whole life. H e n c e it is of natural law that parents should lay up for
their children, and that children should be their parents' heirs."
Because sustaining the welfare of children is not a limited task of
marriage, but a permanent one, husband and wife "must live
together for ever inseparably." Different notions of the obligations of parents to their grown children divide Thomas and Locke.
For Thomas, the solidarity of the family unit remains crucial to the
welfare of grown children; therefore, the marriage of their parents
is not to be dissolved. The same point can be sustained by an
examination of some of Thomas' arguments for the indissolubility
of marriage in the Summa Contra Gentiles (3. 123). The strain of
individualism in Locke's thought surfaces in his unwillingness to
have parents bound by obligations to their children throughout
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their whole lives: just as children must become free of parents, so
parents must become free of children. The realities of English life,
in Locke's time, however, often made grown children of the better
classes very much dependent upon their parents' good will.
26
See Milton (1644, 1645a, 1645b) and Milton's edition of Bucer's
work on divorce (Bucer, 1644). Also s e e Haller and Haller
(1941-42) and Haller (1946).
27
On "integration" as a formative principle of the Puritan personality, see Barbu (1960: 145-218).
28
T h e c o n v i c t i o n that w e must c h o o s e b e t w e e n erotic selfexpression and rational discipline is well expressed in Die Strasse
(1923), Die Freudlose Gasse (1925).' 'street films" of the 1920s, as
well as in Der Blaue Engel (1930). After the Second World War,
the same theme runs through Das Mcidchen Rosemarie (1958). On
the movies of the 1920s and 30s, especially the street movies, see
Kracauer (1947).
29
S e e Gataker (1623: 11-12).
30
Baxter(1678: II, 12) writes, "Next to the fear of God make choice
of a nature, or temperament
that is not too much unsuitable to
you. A crossness of Dispositions will be a continued vexation: and
you will have a Domestick War instead of L o v e . " Yet he would
not praise, as Rogers does, the mysterious source of the love of a
man and a woman which leads them to wed: "Take special care,
that fansie and passion over-rule not Reason, and Friends advice
in the choice . . .of the person [you marry]. I know you must have
Love to those you match with: But that Love must be Rational,
and such as you can justifie in the severest trial, by the evidences
of worth and fitness in the person whom you love. To say you
Love, but you know not why, is more beseeming Children or mad
folks, than those that are soberly entering upon a change of so
great importance to them" (Baxter, 1678: II, 10).
31
The Puritan casuists, Milton excepted, thought that although temperamental affinity was of prime importance in the choice of a
partner, a man had no right to divorce because he made a bad
choice; see Gataker (1620: 35). Milton went a daring step further.
32
Puritans sometimes say that if you are unfortunate enough to
choose a mate that does not suit your temperament, you must
strive to achieve what is beyond human power: you must bring
yourself to love, by dint of effort and reason, a spouse that does
not suit you. Gataker (1623: 11; 1620: 35), speaking of the choice
of a mate, says that "there are secret links of affection, that no
reason can be rendered of: as there are inbred dislikes, that neither
can be resolved, nor reconciled." " A s there is no affection more
forcible" than love, " s o there is none freer from force and compulsion." He quotes Cassiodorus: " A m o r non cogitur." Yet he
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tells those who have married one they cannot love "to strive even
to enforce their affections; and crave grace at Gods hand, where
by they may be enabled to bring themselves to that disposition,
that God now requireth."
33
I o w e these points to discussion with my wife, Susan Leites.
34
For solid evidence of this, see Hale (1978).
" T h i s was pointed out to me by my father, Nathan Leites, in a
conversation which took place in a Moroccan restaurant on (I
believe) the Boulevard St. Germain (1977).
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